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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case. 
This is the opening brief of the Appellant, Idaho Transportation Department. 
Alma A. Elias-Cruz initially asked the District Court to review the decision of the 
Department's Hearing Official, David J. Baumann. The Department's Hearing Official 
determined that the requirements for suspension of Ms. Elias-Cruz's driving privileges 
set forth in Idaho Code § 18-8002A were complied with and Ms. Elias-Cruz should have 
her driving privileges suspended for ninety days as a result of failing an evidentiary test 
for alcohol concentration. 
The District Court upon entertaining written briefs and Oral Argument determined 
that Ms. Elias-Cruz's due process rights were violated by the Department's Hearing 
Official's rejection of proof regarding the breath testing instruments inherent margin of 
error. The District Court further determined that the rejection of such evidence denied 
Ms. Elias-Cruz of an opportunity for a fair and impartial hearing before the suspension of 
her driving privileges by the Department's Hearing Official. 
b. Party References. 
The Idaho Transportation Department is referred to as the "Department" for 
purposes of this argument. Ms. Eilas-Cruz is specifically referred to by name. Where 
"driver" is used, it is in reference to a hypothetical or to drivers generally. 
c. Reference to the Administrative Record. 
The references to the Department's Administrative Record are made to the 
Appellate Record page number not the Administrative Record page number. The 
Transcript of the Administrative hearing is included in the Record on Appeal as an 
exhibit. The transcript (Tr.) of that hearing is referred to as Administrative License 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Suspension (ALS) Tr. by page and number. 
d. Factual Statement and Procedural History. 
On October 21, 2010 at approximately 2109 hours, Idaho State Police Trooper 
Schwecke was patrolling southbound on U.S. 95 near milepost 361.5 in Latah County, 
Idaho. 
Trooper Schwecke observed a purple Honda CR-V that appeared to be travelling 
over the posted 45 mph speed limit. Trooper Schwecke activated his radar and received a 
steady reading of 52 mph. Trooper Schwecke pulled to the side of the roadway waiting 
for the vehicle to pass and then activated his emergency lights and conducted a stop for 
speeding. Upon approaching the vehicle the driver was identified as Alma A. Elias-Cruz. 
Trooper Schwecke smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the 
vehicle. Ms. Elias-Cruz admitted to consuming alcohol prior to driving. Trooper 
Schwecke then asked Ms. Elias-Cruz to exit the vehicle and perform standardized field 
sobriety tests. Ms. Elias-Cruz unsuccessfully performed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, 
Walk and Turn and One Leg Stand tests. Trooper Schwecke informed Ms. Elias-Cruz 
that she was under arrest for DUI (R. p. 033). Ms. Elias-Cruz provided evidentiary test 
results of .021 and .020 (R. p. 035). 
Ms. Elias-Cruz timely requested an administrative hearing with the Department of 
Transportation's Hearing Official (R. pp. 040-042). 
A hearing was held telephonically with the Idaho Department of Transportation's 
Administrative Hearing Official (R. p. 067). The Hearing Official entered Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order sustaining the suspension of Ms. Elias-Cruz's 
driving privileges on (R. pp. 072-084). 
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A Petition for Judicial Review was filed by Ms. Elias-Cruz (R. p. 008-012). The 
Court upon accepting written briefing and hearing oral argument vacated the 
Department's Hearing Official's decision concluding that sufficient due process was not 
provided to Ms. Elias-Cruz (R. 146-156). 
The Department timely filed its Notice of Appeal. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Issue 1: The Hearing Official did not err by finding that there is not an inherent 
margin of error in the evidentiary test results produced by the Lifeloc FC20. 
Issue 2: The Hearing Official properly determined that the Lifeloc FC20 had 
been calibrated in accordance with the Standard Operating Procedures of the Idaho State 
Police. 
Issue 3: The Hearing Official did not violate due process in suspending Ms. 
Elias-Cruz's driving privileges. This issue has two parts; first the Hearing Official's 
decision does not implicate due process and second Ms. Elias-Cruz did not properly 
preserve a due process challenge to the suspension of her driving privileges as a result of 
a .02 evidentiary breath alcohol content test result. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) sets out the burden of the driver to demonstrate to the 
Hearing Officer that driving privileges should be reinstated because: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been 
driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation 
of the provisions of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho 
Code; or; 
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(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence 
of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-
8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating 
substances administered at the direction of the peace officer were not 
conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4), 
Idaho Code, or the testing equipment was not functioning properly 
when the test was administered; or 
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to 
evidentiary testing as required in subsection (2) of this section. 
The burden of proof rests on the driver to prove any of the grounds to vacate the 
suspension of Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7), Kane v. State, Dept. of Transp., 139 Idaho 
586, 83 P.3d 130 at 143 (Ct. App. 2003). 
The review of disputed issues of fact must be confined to the agency record for 
judicial review. Idaho Code § 67-5277. 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(1) sets out the scope of review. "The Court shall not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on 
questions of fact." Howard v. Canyon County Bd. (~f Com 'rs, 128 Idaho 479, 915 P.2d 
709 (1996). 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) provides: 
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by 
other provision of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency 
action unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, 
conclusions or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
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The appropriate remedy pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act is: 
" ... if the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part and 
remanded for further proceedings as necessary." Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). 
The decision of the Transportation Department must be affirmed unless the order 
violates statutory or constitutional provisions, exceeds the agency's authority, is made 
upon unlawful procedure, is not supported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary, 
capricious or an abuse of discretion. Marshall v. Department (~fTransp., 137 Idaho 337, 
48 P. 3d 666 (2002). The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the 
agency erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial 
right of that party has been prejudiced. Druffel v. State, Dept. of Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 
41 P.3d 739 (2002). 
Appellate review of the District Court's decision requires the Court to review 
"the agency record independently of the District Court's decision", Marshall v. Dept. of 
Transp. 137 Idaho 337,340, 48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct. App. 2002). 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1 
The Hearing Official did not err byfinding that there is not an inherent margin of error 
in the test result produced by the L(feloc FC20. 
Ms. Elias-Cruz argued to the Hearing Official and the District Court that the 
Lifeloc FC20 has an "inherent margin of error", thereby meeting her burden to show that 
her breath alcohol was really not in excess of .02 and therefore not in violation of I.e. § 
18-8004( 1)( d). 1 
Idaho Code § 18-8004(4) defines the circumstances of the Hearing Officer's 
consideration of the evidentiary test. Ms. Elias-Cruz, a twenty year old driver, was in 
violation of I.C. § 18-8004(1)( d) as a result of failing an evidentiary test for breath 
alcohol concentration as defined in I.e. § 18-8004(4). There is no question based upon 
this Record that the evidentiary test for breath alcohol content indicated an alcohol 
concentration of at least 0.02 (R. p. 030). 
Ms. Elias-Cruz offered proof to the Department's Hearing Official of an inherent 
margin of error in the operation of the Lifeloc FC20 breath testing device and argued that 
such margin of error should be taken into consideration to determine if there is a failed 
breath test under I.e. § 18-8002A(7). Ms. Elias-Cruz introduced the testimony of Loring 
Beals and by argument sought to impose a standard of breath alcohol testing not required 
by the Idaho State Police, the Idaho Legislature, or the Idaho Courts. 
I I.e. § 18-8004( 1 )( d) provides: 
It is unlawful for any person under the age of twenty-one (21) years who has an alcohol 
concentration of at least 0.02 but less than 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this section, to 
drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a highway, 
street or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the public. Any person violating this 
subsection shall be subject to the penalties provided in section 18-8004A, Idaho Code. 
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Ms. Elias-Cruz bases the argument for an inherent margin of error on an alleged 
sensitivity of the Lifeloc FC20 breath testing device and Ms. Elias-Cruz not 
demonstrating any external signs of intoxication. The Idaho Court has rejected proof of 
any external signs of intoxication impacting an evidentiary test failure, Reisenauer v. 
State, Dept. of Transp. 145 Idaho 948, 188 P.3d 890 (2008). 
Ms. Elias-Cruz offers the testimony of Loring Beals for the proposition that Ms. 
Elias-Cruz's alcohol concentration was really less than the 0.02 at the time of testing. 
Mr. Beals testifies as to what he believes the blood alcohol would be (ALS Hrg Tr. p. 10 
L. 1-10). Mr. Beals does not testify that the Lifeloc FC20 was not properly functioning 
or was not properly calibrated leading to a conclusion that the breath test result was not 
administered consistent with I.C. § 18-8004, I.C. § 18-8002A(7)( d). 
The administrative record does not provide any basis for a conclusion that the 
tests results did not show an alcohol concentration in violation of I.C. § 18-8004(1)( d). 
The Hearing Official carefully considered the argument and evidence offered by Ms. 
Elias-Cruz (R. pp. 072-082). 
Here, the standard isn't whether Ms. Elias-Cruz could be convicted of driving 
under the influence pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(1)( d). There is no factual question here 
for the Court's review that the test results did not show an alcohol concentration in 
violation of I. C. § 18-8004. The only question for the Department's Hearing Official and 
the only question for the Court upon review of the Hearing Official's conclusion pursuant 
to I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(c) is whether there is a failed evidentiary test. Here, Ms. Elias-
Cruz's test result indicated a failed evidentiary test. 
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There is no basis to accept an inherent margin of error in the results of breath 
testing given the clear meaning of I.e. § 18-8004(1) in the Administrative License 
Suspension context. The Idaho Court of Appeals decision in McDaniel v. State, Dept. of 
Transp., 149 Idaho 643, 239 P.3d 36, 39 (Idaho Ct. App. 2010), specifically rejects the 
analysis posed by Ms. Elias-Cruz.2 
The Idaho State Police in the Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedures 
Manual do not recognize a margin of error in a performance verification. Instead of a 
margin of error, the Idaho State Police recognize a range of results which will indicate a 
sufficient performance verification.3 
I.C. § 18-8004(1)( d) does not contemplate "an alcohol concentration of 0.02 plus 
or minus a margin of error", instead I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(c) requires Ms. Elias-Cruz to 
show a test result of less than 0.02. 
I.C. § 18-8004(1)( d) does not contain language permitting the consideration of an 
inherent margin of error. Ms. Elias-Cruz wants to read into I.C. § 18-8004(1)( d), a 
2 When statutory language is interpreted to require license suspension upon indicating a certain 
BAC, courts have ruled that a drivers license can still be revoked irrespective of the margin of error. 
Consequently any inherent margin of error is disregarded. McDaniel v. State. Dept. of Transp. 149 Idaho 
643,239 P.3d 36 (2010). 
5.1.5 Acceptable results for a 0.08 or 0.20 performance verification is a pair of samples in 
sequence that are both within+l- 10% of the performance verification solution target 
value. Target values and ranges of acceptable results are included in a certificate of 
analysis for each solution lot series, prepared by, and available from, the ISPFS. 
NOTE: Due to external factors associated with changing a performance verification 
solution the results of the initial performance verification may not be within the 
acceptable range, therefore the performance verification may be repeated until a pair 
of satisfactory results are obtained. However, if results after a total of three test 
series for any solution (equivalent to six tests) are still unsatisfactory, contact the 
appropriate ISPFS Laboratory. The instrument should not be used for evidentiary 
testing until the problem is corrected and performance verification results are within 
the acceptable range. The suggested troubleshooting procedure should be followed 
if the initial performance verification does not meet the acceptance criteria. 
Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedures, Revision 2 Effective 1110 I 120 10, pp. 10-11. 
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requirement which is not found in the statute. Since the language is unambiguous, the 
Court does not have to engage in statutory analysis to apply the statute's plain meaning, 
Callies v. O'Neal 147 Idaho 841,847,216 P.3d 130 (2009). 
I.C. § lS-S004(4) does not reference an inherent margin of error. 
Neither do I.C. § lS-S002A(7)(c) or (d) contain language that reqUIres the 
Department's Hearing Official to take into account any inherent margin of error in the 
reported breath test results before a license can be suspended for the failure of an 
evidentiary test. I.C. § lS-S004(1)(d) simply requires that the test results indicate a 
breath alcohol test result in excess of the legal limit, substituting here 0.02 for O.OS, 
McDaniel v. State, Dept. oj Transp., 149 1daho 643, 646, 239 P.3d 36, 39 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2010). 
The Depatiment's Hearing Official in A1cDaniel did not error in sustaining the 
suspension of McDaniel's driving privileges based upon a breath alcohol content of 
0.OS3, I.C. § lS-S004(1)(a). The Department's Hearing Official here did not error 
finding that an evidentiary test result for breath alcohol content of 0.02 and 0.021 was 
sufficient evidence that Ms. Elias-Cruz did not meet her burden pursuant to I.C. § lS-
S002A(7)( c). 
The Court of Appeals in McDaniel rejects out of hand any consideration of an 
inherent margin of error to be considered by a Hearing Official to conclude that a test 
result indicate something other than what the test results indicate. 
Ms. Elias-Cruz argued below that the social ills addressed by prohibiting drivers 
under the age of 21 who operate motor vehicles from having any measurable breath 
alcohol is not necessarily intended to keep under age people from driving. There is a 
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reasonable relationship between the policy of prohibiting under age drivers from having 
measurable amounts of alcohol in the blood and safety for the traveling public.4 
However, Ms. Elias-Cruz did not make a substantive due process or equal 
protection argument to the Hearing Official or to the District Court. 
The Hearing Official is not determining whether there was a reasonable doubt that 
Ms. Elias-Cruz's breath alcohol content was actually above a .02 and therefore was guilty 
of driving under the influence pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004( d). The Hearing Official only 
determined that Ms. Elias-Cruz failed to meet her burden under I.e. § 18-8002A(7). The 
argument as to the inherent margin of error may well have a place in the Idaho criminal 
jurisprudence but the Idaho Court has clearly indicated that an inherent margin of error is 
not applicable in the Administrative License Suspension process.5 
There is nothing in this Record to distinguish Ms. Elias-Cruz's result from a failed 
evidentiary test with an adult driver whose blood alcohol concentration was in excess of 
.08 (See for example AfcDaniel's .083 result). I.C. § 18-8004(1)( d) simply requires a 
failed evidentiary test. 
Ms. Elias-Cruz's burden is not to show what her "actual" breath alcohol content 
might have been, instead Ms. Elias-Cruz's burden is to show that the elements of I.e. § 
18-8002A(7) have been met .. 
4 Buell v. Idaho Dept. of Transp. 15! Idaho 257, 254 P.3d ! 253 (20 I !) contains a significant analysis ofthe 
public's interest in the Administrative License Suspension process in the context of a double jeopardy 
analysis. 
5 Ms. Elias-Cruz's argument may be best advanced in the criminal setting arguing that the State might not 
meet its burden to persuade the jury that Ms. Elias-Cruz was "under the influence". However, the question 
here is whether Ms. Elias-Cruz met her burden pursuant to I.e. § 18-8002A(7)(c) to demonstrate that the 
test result was not at least .02. 
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There is no requirement nor can one be reasonably read into the provisions of I.C. 
§ 18-8002A(7) that Ms. Elias-Cruz meets her burden if she shows she is not physically 
under the influence or is not affected by the alcohol she consumed, instead the standard is 
whether she can show that the test result did not show a breath test result of at least .02, 
I.e. § 18-8004(l)(d). 
ISSUE 2 
The Hearing Official properly determined that the Lffeloc FC20 had been calibrated in 
accordance with the Standard Operating Procedures of the Idaho State Police. 
Ms. Elias-Cruz challenged the Hearing Official's conclusion that Ms. Elias-
Cruz's evidentiary tests were not conducted in accordance with the requirements ofI.C. § 
18-8004(l)(d), I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(d). 
Ms. Elias-Cruz did not show that the breath testing instrument was not properly 
calibrated to meet her burden pursuant to I.e. § 18-8002A(7)( d) (R. p. 031). 
There is nothing based upon this Record to support a finding that the .08 
performance verification was not within the target range. 
There is no statute, rule or Idaho State Police Standard Operating Procedure 
which require that a performance verification be done annually. 
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Ms. Elias-Cruz seeks to supplement the Idaho State Police Breath Alcohol 
Standard Operating Procedure by adding a new provision not part of the Standard 
Operating Procedures arguably based upon a manuiacturer's recommendation.6 
5. Performance Verification of Breath Testing Instruments 
Perfonnance verification aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BTS) and the Idaho State Police 
Forensic Services (lSPFS) in determining if a breath testing instrument is functioning correctly. 
Performance verifications are performed using a wet bath simulator performance verification solution. The 
solution is provided by andlor approved by ISPFS. The ISPFS analysis establishes the target value and 
acceptable range of the solutions used for the verification and includes the acceptable values on the 
Certificate of Analysis for each solution. Note: The ISPFS established target values may be different from 
those shown on the bottle label. 
5.1 Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20-Portable Breath Testing Instrument Perfonnance 
Verification. 
5.1.1 The Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 portable breath testing instrument 
performance verification is run using approximately 0.08 and/or0.20 
perfonnance verification solutions provided by andlor approved by ISPFS. 
5.1.2 The perfonnance verification using the 0.08 and 0.20 performance verification 
solutions consist of two samples. 
5.1.3 A performance verification of the Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 instruments 
using a 0.08 or 0.20 performance verification solution must be performed within 
24 hours, before or after an evidentiary test to be approved for evidentiary use. 
Multiple breath alcohol tests may be covered by a single performance 
verification. Reference 5.1.4.1 for clarification on the use ofthe 0.20 solution in 
this capacity. 
5.1.3.1 A 0.08 perfonnance verification solution should be replaced with fresh solution 
approximately every 25 verifications or every calendar month, whichever comes 
first. 
5.1.4 A 0.20 perfonnance verification should be run and results logged once per 
calendar month and replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25 
verifications or until it reaches its expiration date, whichever comes first. 
NOTE: The 0.20 perfonnance verification was implemented for the sole 
purpose of supporting the instruments' results for an 18-8004C charge. Failure 
to timely perform a 0.20 performance verification will not invalidate test 
perfonned that yield results at other levels or in charges other than 18-8004C. 
5.1.4.1 The 0.20 perfonnance verification satisfies the requirement for performance 
verification within 24 hours, before or after an evidentiary test at any level. The 
0.20 perfonnance verification solution should not be used routinely for this 
purpose. 
Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedures, Revision 2 Effective 11/01120 I 0, pp. 10-11. (See 
also FN 2) 
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The manufacturer's recommendation relied upon Ms. Elias-Cruz before the 
Department's Hearing Official is not a requirement of the Idaho State Police's Standard 
Operating Procedures. Exhibit D (to the Administrative Record) CR. pp. 054-055) 
indicates that "Lifeloc recommends you calibrate your FC once a year or if it fails two 
consecutive calibration checks". Ms. Elias-Cruz doesn't point out to the Hearing 
Official, the phrase following: "In addition, check with your program administrator for 
any additional requirements or guidelines your organization may have." Nor can Ms. 
Elias-Cruz demonstrate based on this Record that the Lifeloc FC20 was not calibrated 
annually as suggested by the manufacturer. Nor does the Record contain any evidence of 
decertification if the Lifeloc FC20 had not been calibrated according to the 
manufacturer's suggestion.7 
Lifeloc Technologies defers to the Idaho State Police as to any guidelines for the 
calibration and operation of the Lifeloc FC20. The Frequently Asked Questions (R. p. 
054) address how often a calibration check should be performed on the Lifeloc FC20: 
"Calibration check requirements vary depending on the program guidelines or internal 
procedures you're testing under. Please check with your program administrator." The 
Idaho State Police as the program administrator has not required annual calibrations. 
The Court cannot assume that the Legislature intended the Standard Operating 
Procedures to be supplemental rather than exclusive. In fact the Idaho Court has 
specifically indicated in judicial review of an Administrative License Suspension that the 
Idaho State Police's Standard Operating Procedures are not supplemental but are instead 
7 Mr. Beals did not testify as to whether the tests were inaccurate based upon a performance verification not 
having occurred annually or that there was a Standard Operating Procedure of the Idaho State Police 
requiring annual calibrations. 
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construed "as rules". In re Schroeder, 147 Idaho 476,479,210 P.3d 584,587 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 2009). 8 
Here, the Court's review is limited to considering whether Trooper Schwecke's 
actions are consistent with the Idaho State Police's Standard Operating Procedures not 
the Lifeloc FC20 manufacturer's representations. Any other statutory interpretation flies 
in the face of the Idaho Court's interpretation of the effect of the Idaho State Police's 
Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedures. The Idaho Court found the Idaho State 
Police Standard Operating Procedures are rules for purposes of judicial review because 
the Standard Operating Procedures constitute the only materials by which the Idaho State 
Police has acted upon pursuant to the I.e. § 18-8004(4) authorization for the 
promulgation of rules regarding breath alcohol testing instruments and methods, In re 
Schroeder, 147 Idaho 476,481,210 P.3d 584,589 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009). 
Nor is there anything in this Record to suggest that the use of the Lifeloc FC20 
requires the adoption of the manufacturer's recommendations. If such requirement does 
not exist in the only materials which the Idaho State Police has acted on, then it is clear 
that the Standard Operating Procedures are not to be supplemented by manufacturer's 
"recommendations" not contained within the Standard Operating Procedures. 
The ISP has been given the responsibility to promulgate regulations for administration of 
breath alcohol tests, I.e. §§ IS-S002A(3), IS-S004( 4); Idaho Admin. Code (IDAPA) 
11.03.01.013.03, and has done so through creation of standard operating procedures and 
training manuals for the use of breath test instruments, including the Intoxilyzer 5000. 
See Idaho State Police, Standard Operating Procedure: Breath Alcohol Testing (Rev. 
November 2006) (SOP)I; Idaho State Police, Intoxilyzer 5000: Operator's Training 
Manual (Intoxilyzer 5000 Manual) (March 2007). Failure to abide by the regulations set 
forth in the standard operating procedures and training manuals renders the test 
inadmissible as evidence absent expert testimony that the improperly administered test 
nevertheless produced reliable results. 
In re Schroeder, 147 Idaho 476, 478, 210 P.3d 584, 586 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009). 
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The Idaho State Police in adopting Standard Operating Procedures have clearly 
implemented the circumstances of performance verification of the Lifeloc FC20. 
Here, there is sufficient evidence in the Record for the conclusion that the Lifeloc 
FC20 was properly calibrated. The last .08 calibration was within an acceptable range 
and was performed within twenty four hours of the test administered to Ms. Elias-Cruz 
(R. p. 031) and is consistent with the Standard Operating Procedures. 
A .20 calibration is not necessary here. The Standard Operating Procedures 
clearly address the circumstances and the effect of the .20 performance verification (see 
SOP § 5.1.4).9 
Clearly, a .20 performance verification has nothing to do with sufficiency of the 
testing of Ms. Elias-Cruz's breath alcohol. Ms. Elias-Cruz's .02 result is not impacted by 
the lack of a .20 performance verification. 
There is no basis for an argument for a statutory interpretation that would permit 
the consideration of recommendations not included by the Idaho State Police in the 
Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedures. 
The performance of the Lifeloc FC20 was verified pursuant to the Idaho State 
Police's Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedures. The manufacturer's 
recommendations are not incorporated in the Lifeloc FC20 Standard Operating 
9 
5.104 A 0.20 perfonnance verification should be run and results logged once per calendar 
month and replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25 verifications or until it 
reaches its expiration date, whichever comes first. 
NOTE: The 0.20 perfonnance verification was implemented for the sole purpose of 
supporting the instruments' results for an IS-S004C charge. Failure to timely perform a 
0.20 performance verification will not invalidate test performed that yield results at other 
levels or in charges other than JS-S004C. 
Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedures, Revisions 2 Effective 11/0112010, p. 10. 
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Procedures. There is no requirement that Ms. Elias-Cruz can point to indicating that the 
Lifeloc FC20 must have a performance verification completed within 12 months of 
testing where the result is not in excess of .20. 10 
ISSUE 3 
The Hearing Official did not violate due process in suspending lvls. Elias-Cruz's driving 
privileges. This issue has two parts; .first the Hearing Official's decision does not 
implicate due process and second l,ds. Elias-Cruz did not properly preserve a due process 
challenge to the suspension of her driving privileges as a result of a .02 evidentiary 
breath alcohol content test result. 
The District Court concludes that due process is violated when the Hearing 
Official fails to consider the Lifeloc FC20's "inherent margin of error". Further, the 
District Court found that the rejection of such evidence by the Department's Hearing 
Official deprived Ms. Elias-Cruz of a fair and impartial hearing. 
Ms. Elias-Cruz did not make a procedural due process challenge to the Hearing 
Official nor to the District Court. The District Court gratuitously and sua sponte provides 
the due process analysis. 
10 
This argument would go only to the issue of whether the Lifeloc FC20 was not properly certified, an 
argument which was not made to the Department's Hearing Official. 
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The District Court does not engage in the Mathews v. Eldridge, analysis (424 US. 
319 at 333, 96 s.Ct. 893, 47 LED 2d 18, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976)) to demonstrate what 
process was due for its conclusion that it was inappropriate the Hearing Official to reject 
the Court of Appeals decision in McDaniel and conclude that an inherent margin of error 
must be considered. 11 
Contrary to the District COUl1 conclusions, the Hearing Official heard the 
testimony of Loring Beals and permitted Ms. Elias-Cruz to create a record consistent with 
her argument that an inherent margin of error exists (R. p. 050 Ex A., R. pp. 051-052 Ex. 
B, R. p. 053 Ex. C, R. pp. 054-055 Ex. D.). 
11 
Due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, 
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 u.s. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 L. Ed 2d J 8 (1976). 
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The Hearing Official made specific findings of his decision making process 
demonstrating that he considered Ms. Elias-Cruz's arguments. 12 
The Hearing Official appropriately rejected the expert's opinion as to the Lifeloc 
FC 20's margin of error based on the present state of Idaho Law, AlcDaniel. There was 
nothing in the process of the conduct of the Hearing which violates due process. The 
Administrative License Suspension process has survived numerous due process 
12 
3.1 Elias-Cruz submitted to breath testing October 21, 2010. 
3.2 Elias-Cruz provided breath samples of .0211.020. 
3.3 Idaho's legal limit for breath alcohol concentration (BRAC) for person's under 21 years of age is 
.02. 
3.4 At the time ofElias-Cruz's stop and arrest, she was 20 years of age (Date of Birth- . 
3.5 The acceptable performance verification check conducted October 22, 2010, at 1930 hours, with 
performance verification results of .081, approved the breath testing instrument for evidentiary use 
in accordance with the ISP Standard Operating Procedure. 
3.6 The Bureau of Forensic Services of the ISP, pursuant to IDAPA Rule 11.03.01, provides that a 
breath-testing instrument shall be checked on a schedule established by the Department for 
accuracy with a simulator solution provided by the Department. 
3.7 So long as the performance verification results are within the allotted and acceptable range, the 
instrument is properly calibrated and all tests performed on the instrument are deemed reliable. 
3.8 The Idaho State Police Standard Operating Procedure and the Operator Training Manuals do not 
require nor indicate that the actual tests performed on a properly calibrated instrument be adjusted 
due to the margin of error of the simulator solution or testing instrument. 
3.9 Additionally, I.C. § 18-8002A does not provide nor allow for the margin of error to be taken into 
consideration with respect to the breath test results. 
3.10 In considering this argument, such reasoning would have the effect of making the legal limit a 
moving target depending on which evidentiary testing instrument was used in a particular case. 
3.11 If the Petitioner's reasoning was adopted in this case this hearing officer would, in effect, rewrite 
the statute and establish a legal limit of 0.025, which this hearing officer is not inclined to do. 
3.12 In State of Idaho v. Bryan Lee McDaniel, Court of Appeals of the State of Idaho, 2010 Opinion 
No. 58, the court held that the plain meeting of the statutory language is that a driver's license will 
be suspended upon test results indicating a BAC of 0.08 or more, not 0.08 plus or minus any 
margin of error. .. nowhere does I.C. § 18-8002A contain language that requires the hearing 
officer to take into account any inherent error within the breath test machine before a license can 
be suspended, it simply requires that the test results indicate a BAC in excess of the legal limit, 
which is 0.08. Therefore, any inherent margin of error in the test results is disregarded. 
3.13 Based on the foregoing court ruling and decision, the same can be held true for an underage DUI 
where the legal limit is set at 0.02. 
3.14 Other than argument and speculation. the record is absent of any affirmative evidence showing 
that Elias-Cruz's BRAC results were less than the legal limit of 0.02. 
3.15 Contrary to argument, the evidentiary testing instrument was properly calibrated within 24 hours 
of Elias-Cruz's breath test as mandated by the Standard Operating Procedure. 
3.16 Elias-Cruz's argument fails. 
3.17 Elias-Cruz's BRAC results were in violation of I.e. § 18-8004, and the evidentiary test results are 
admissible evidence. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order p. 8, R. pp. 077-079. 
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challenges, for example the careful analysis, In re Suspension of Driver's License of 
Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937.155 P.3d 1176 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Secondly, the driver must preserve a procedural due process challenge for the 
Court's review even if the Hearing Official could not actually rule on the constitutionality 
of the administrative action. I3 
A due process challenge was not preserved for the District Court's review and 
should not now be considered by the Supreme Court on Appeal. 
The Idaho Court has clearly indicated that the only issues which the Court should 
sua sponte consider are subject matter jurisdiction ("with the exception of jurisdictional 
issues, an argument not raised below and not supported on the briefs is waived on 
appeal", Doe v. Doe, 150 Idaho 432, 247 P.3d 659 (2011)) and illegality, Trees v. Kersey, 
158 Idaho 3,56 P.3d 765 (2002). 
The Court in McDaniel determined that the statutory language of I.C. IS-
S004(l)(a) does not require a findings of the actual breath alcohol content by the 
Department's Hearing Official, the Question is what is the test result. Any other statutory 
language would lead to the analysis suggested by the District Court, an inquiry into the 
actual blood alcohol content at the time of evidentiary testing. The margin of error is 
simply not relevant in the administrative process under I.C. § IS-S002A(7), A1cDaniei at 
645. 
The Hearing Official acted consistently with the law existing at the time of the 
Department's administrative hearing eliminating consideration of the Lifeloc FC20 
13 
"The actions of the hearing officer evidence little regard for Bell's substantial interest in receiving 
a decision before, or at least promptly after, the deprivation of his license, nonetheless because this 
constitutional issue was not raised to the Hearing Officer we will not resolve it on appeal, see 
Viveros v. State Dept. of Health and Welfare, 126 Idaho 714, 7 J 6, 889 P.2d 1 J 04. 1106 (J 996). 
Bell v. Idaho Transp. Dept. J 51 Idaho 659,262 P.3d 1030 (201 J). 
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inherent margin of error. 
The District Court disregards the administrative record which the driver created 
when it finds that the Hearing Official denied Ms. Elias-Cruz an opportunity for a fair 
and impartial hearing. Ms. Elias-Cruz was able to present evidence to the Hearing 
Official that was carefully and thoroughly considered by the Department's Hearing 
Official CR. pp. 077-079). 
Sufficient due process was extended to Ms. Elias-Cruz. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ms. Elias-Cruz did not met her burden pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) to 
demonstrate that the Hearing Official's Decision was arbitrary or capricious or that the 
Hearing Official's Decision was not supported by substantial competent evidence on the 
Record. 
Due process was provided to Ms. Elias-Cruz, there is no unlawful procedure 
present nor was the Hearing Official's action in excess to the Department's statutory 
authority consistent with I.C. § 67-5279(3). 
The Hearing Official's decision to suspend Ms. Elias-Cruz's driving privileges 
should be sustained and Ms. Elias-Cruz's driving privileges should be suspended for 
ninety days. 
DATED this day of March 2012. 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
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